PATTERNS OF CABINET FORMATION IN INDONESIA: THE CASE OF YUDHOYONO AND WIDODO’S CABINETS
Aryo Wasisto
| Abstract views: 0
| 
views: 0
Abstract
This article discusses cabinet formation in Indonesia, in which the character is directly influenced by the multiparty presidential system in which the presidential party is always in the minority. The coalition cabinet has several problems, primarily regulating the sectoral egos of the ministers who are representatives of political parties. This problem shows rational interests, which are popularly referred to as extractive oligarchy. It affects the performance of the country's economy, where the focus of reorganization has immensely drawn attention. This article uses a qualitative method, especially the document analysis; suggests that the portfolio allocation of cabinet ministers in Indonesia affects the performance and solidity of the coalition. There are similarities between the Yudhoyono and Widodo administrations; the cabinet is filled with politicians, business people, non-political business people, and experts. Interestingly, both governments maximized the non-political entrepreneur in the second period as a formal tie of reciprocal performance during the campaign. In the future, these coalition patterns require objective supervision from the people's representative institutions to scrutinize ministers so as not to get caught up in their sectoral egos.
Abstrak
Artikel ini membahas tentang pembentukan kabinet di Indonesia yang karakternya dipengaruhi lansung oleh sistem presidensial multipartai dimana partai presidensial selalu menjadi minoritas. Kabinet koalisi memiliki beberapa masalah, terutama kesulitan dalam pengaturan ego sektoral para menteri yang mewakili partai politik. Hal ini menunjukkan kepentingan-kepentingan rasional yang kemudian popular disebut oligarki. Problem ini mempengaruhi kinerja perekonomian negara, dimana fokus reorganisasi telah menyita banyak waktu presiden. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif, khususnya analisis dokumen, artikel ini menemukan bahwa alokasi portofolio menteri kabinet di Indonesia mempengaruhi kinerja dan soliditas koalisi. Ada kesamaan antara rezim Yudhoyono dan Joko Widodo; kabinet diisi oleh politisi, pebisnis, politisi, pebisnis non-politik, dan pakar. Menariknya, kedua pemerintah memaksimalkan posisi menteri dari latar belakang pengusaha non-politik pada periode ke-2 sebagai ikatan formal kinerja timbal balik selama kampanye. Jokowi periode ke-2 menghasilkan fenomena bergabungnya rival Prabowo ke dalam pemerintahan yang berbarengan dengan. Pada masa mendatang, pola-pola koaliisi ini membutuhkan konsekuensi pengawasan objektif dari lembaga perwakilan rakyat yang untuk memonitor para menteri untuk tidak terjebak dalam ego sektoral mereka.
Keywords
Full Text:
PDFReferences
Books
Linz, Juan J.(1994).“Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America, edited by Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, 3–89. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mietzner, Marcus. (2013) Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia. Singapore: NUS Press.
Müller, W. C, and K. Strøm. (2008). “Coalition Agreements and Cabinet Governance.” In Bargaining and the Cycle of Democratic Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. (2008). “Electoral Systems and Economic Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0040.
Williams, Robert. (2000). Party Finance and Political Corruption. Party Finance and Political Corruption. Palgrave Mcmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333978061.
Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge University Press.
Journals
Acemoglu, Daron. (2008). Oligarchic Versus Democratic Soceties. Journal Economic Association 6, no. 1, 1–44.
Aspinall, Edward, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomas. (2015). The Yudhoyono Presidency Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation. The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation. Singapore: ISEAS. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814620727-018.
Bäck, Hanna, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Benjamin Nyblade. (2017). Multiparty Government and Economic Policy-Making: Coalition Agreements, Prime Ministerial Power and Spending in Western European Cabinets. Public Choice 170, no. 1–2, 33–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0373-0.
Booth, Anne, and Peter McCawley. (1981). The Indonesian Economy during the Soeharto Era. East Asian Social Science Monographs. 39, no. 2: xxv, 329 p.
Bowen, Glenn A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. Qualitative Research Journal. https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027.
Breton, A. (1974). The Behavior of Political Parties. In: The Economic Theory of Representative Government. Case Studies in Economics. London: Palgrave MacMillan. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02387-5_7.
Brezis, Elise S, and Joël Cariolle. (2015). Measuring Conflicts of Interest: A Revolving Door Indicator. FERDI Working Paper Development Indicators. Vol. 122. https://econ.biu.ac.il/files/economics/shared/staff/u46/measuring_conflcts_of_interest--a_revolving_door_indicator.pdf.
Cheibub, José Antonio. (2006). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813344.
David Altman. (2000). The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies. Party Politics 6, no. 3, 259–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589340903017999.
Freudenreich, Johannes. (2016). The Formation of Cabinet Coalitions in Presidential Systems’. Latin American Politics and Society 58, no. 4 , 80–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/laps.12003.
Hagen, Juergen von, and Ian J Harden. (1995). Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline. European Economic Review 39, no. 3–4 , 771–79. https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:3-4:p:771-779.
Haris, Syamsuddin. (2016). Demokratisasi Partai Dan Dilema Sistem Kepartaian Di Indonesia. Jurnal Penelitian Politik.
———.(2014). Koalisi Dalam Sistem Demokrasi Presidensial Indonesia: Faktor Faktor Kerapuhan Koalisi Era Presiden Yudhoyono. Jurnal Penelitian Politik 8, no. 1, 1–14.
Iqbal, Muhammad, Yunita Elianda, Ali Akbar, and Nurhadiyanti. (2020). USA–China Trade War: Economic Impact on Indonesia. Journal of Public Affairs, no. October (2020). https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2543.
Klüver, Heike, and Hanna Bäck. (2019). Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance. Comparative Political Studies 52, no. 13–14,1995–2031. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019830726.
Linz, Juan J. (1994). Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? In The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America, edited by Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, 3–89. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Masitoh, Siti (2021). ‘Simal Evaluasi Kinerja Menteri Bidang Ekonomi Pemerintahan Jokowi’. Kontan.co.id, 2021. https://newssetup.kontan.co.id/news/simak-evaluasi-kinerja-menteri-bidang-ekonomi-selama-dua-tahun-pemerintahan-jokowi.
Mietzner, Marcus. (2013). Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia. Singapore: NUS Press.
Morgenstern, Scott, Juan Javier Negri, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. (2008). Parliamentary Opposition in Non-Parliamentary Regimes: Latin America. Journal of Legislative Studies 14, no. 1–2, 160–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330801921166.
Müller, W. C, and K. Strøm. (2008). Coalition Agreements and Cabinet Governance. In Bargaining and the Cycle of Democratic Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 159–99.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. (2008). Electoral Systems and Economic Policy. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0040.
Sanjaya, Muhammad Ryan. (2016). The Political Economy of Coalition in Indonesia. Journal of Developing Economies 1, no. 1, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.20473/jde.v1i1.1773.
Slater, Dan. (2018) ‘PARTY CARTELIZATION, Indonesian-STYLE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER-SHARING and the CONTINGENCY of DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION’. Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 1, 23–46. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2017.26.
Tapsell, Ross. (2013). Media Power in Indonesia: Oligarchs, Citizens And The Digital Revolution. Rowman & Littlefield International. Vol. 53, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
Tomsa, Dirk. (2014). Party System Fragmentation in Indonesia: The Subnational Dimension. Journal of East Asian Studies 14, no. 2 (2014): 249–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800008924.
Wasisto, Aryo, and Prayudi. (2019).Gerakan Mahasiswa Dan Upaya Mengurai Polemik Tuntutan. Info Singkat, 2019. http://berkas.dpr.go.id/puslit/files/info_singkat/Info Singkat-XI-19-I-P3DI-Oktober-2019-2063.pdf.
Williams, Robert.(2000). Party Finance and Political Corruption. Party Finance and Political Corruption. Palgrave Mcmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333978061.
Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge University Press.
———. (2013). Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia. Indonesia 2013, no. 96Special Issue 11–33. https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.96.0099.
Yanuarti, Sri. (2013). The Seeking of Election and Party System To Strenghthening Presidential System. Penelitian Politik 10, no. 2,95–111.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Refbacks
- There are currently no refbacks.
