PERAN STRUKTUR SOSIAL-EKONOMI DAN TOKOH AGAMA DALAM COLLECTIVE EFFICACY KOMUNITAS

Davy Hendri
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Abstract

Reducing citizen’s anti-social behaviour has become a major problem that must be faced by governments in various countries of the world, including Indonesia, since the past few days. The establishment of collective efficacy is intended as an overview of community capacity to enforce the social regulation in order to achieve citizen participation in activities (collective action) should be one of the goals of anti-social behaviour prevention policies. In the socio-economic structure are very heterogeneous community, realizing it is becoming a big challenge. This article examines the relationship between socio-economic structure (SES) of the community with the creation of collective efficacy. In contrast to some studies on the same theme, this paper raises the quality of the influence of religious leaders as a construct of collective efficacy. In this context, harmony and enforcement of common rules is a form of collective efficacy can be initiated by religious leaders (ulama) as informal leaders at the community level itself. Furthermore, continued with the analysis of the impact of collective efficacy in the community against efforts to create public goods such as security through collective action, by and at the level of the community itself. Analyses were performed using socio-economic data analysis unit based community with about 400 districts/cities of 33 provinces in Indonesia in cross-section in 2011. This study found that the socio-economic structure of stable communities, especially in determining the formation of collective efficacy and quality and local leaders, especially religious leaders turned out to encourage collective action play an important role in the prevention of anti-social behaviour.

Keywords

social-economy structures; religious leaders; anti-social behaviour; collective action; collective efficacy community

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Halimatussadiah, Alin. (2013). “Social Capital to Streghten Collective Environmental Action in Indonesia”, Disertasi Doktoral tidak dipublikasikan, Depok: Ilmu Ekonomi, Fakultas Ekonomi, Universitas Indonesia.

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