

Articulation of Indonesia's Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy in Responding Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Artikulasi Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia Bebas-Aktif dalam Merespon Konflik Rusia-Ukraina

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Riwayat Artikel	Abstract
Diterima: 13 September 2023 Direvisi: 21 Oktober 2023 Disetujui: 2 November 2023 doi: 10.22212/jp.v14i2.4160	<p>This study is about Indonesia's foreign policy in responding to the Russian and Ukrainian conflict. The war in Ukraine has attracted wide attention and influenced many country's foreign policy, including Indonesia as one of the middle powers in Asia. The conflict has sharpened the bipolarization between Ukraine supported by Western countries and Russia itself. It presents serious challenges for Indonesia, which has long been known as a neutral and non-aligned country. Under the free-active foreign policy doctrine, Indonesia is facing serious challenges to take a firm stance on the Russian-Ukrainian war and continuing its leadership in the G20 and ASEAN. Therefore, this study seeks to analyze Indonesia's foreign policy behavior and its country's role it has built in dealing with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. By using role theory of foreign policy analysis and qualitative research methods especially textual analysis, this study finds that Indonesia displays three faces of foreign policy toward Russia-Ukraine war. First, steadfast commitment and respect to international law and the UN Charter, especially sovereignty and territorial integrity; Second, articulate free-active foreign policy attitude that integrates two opposing blocks; Third, pursue foreign policy that is advantageous for domestic interests and economic gains.</p> <p>Keywords: Foreign Policy; Bebas-Aktif; Russia-Ukraine Conflict; Economic Diplomacy; Domestic Politics.</p>

Abstrak

Studi ini merupakan penelitian mengenai kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia dalam menyikapi konflik Rusia dan Ukraina. Perang di Ukraina telah menarik perhatian luas dan mempengaruhi kebijakan luar negeri banyak negara termasuk Indonesia sebagai salah satu negara-negara kekuatan menengah di Asia. Konflik ini telah mempertajam bipolarisasi antara Ukraina yang didukung oleh negara-negara Barat dan Rusia sendiri. Situasi politik ini memberikan tantangan serius bagi Indonesia yang telah lama dikenal sebagai negara netral dan non-aliansi. Dengan mengusung politik luar negeri bebas-aktif, Indonesia dihadapkan pada tantangan untuk mengambil sikap tegas terhadap perang Rusia-Ukraina serta melanjutkan kepemimpinan di G20 dan ASEAN. Karena itu, studi ini bermaksud untuk menganalisis perilaku politik luar negeri RI dan peran yang dibangun dalam menghadapi konflik Rusia-Ukraina. Dengan menggunakan teori peran dalam analisa kebijakan luar negeri dan metode riset kualitatif analisis teks, studi ini menemukan bahwa Indonesia menampilkan tiga wajah politik luar negeri terhadap perang Rusia-Ukraina. Pertama, teguh pada penghormatan terhadap hukum internasional dan Piagam PBB terutama prinsip kedaulatan dan integritas teritorial; kedua, menjalankan politik luar negeri bebas-aktif mengintegrasikan dua blok yang

berseberangan; ketiga, menjalankan kebijakan luar negeri yang menguntungkan bagi kepentingan domestik dan keuntungan ekonomi.

Kata Kunci: Politik Luar Negeri; Bebas-Aktif; Konflik Rusia-Ukraina; Diplomasi Ekonomi; Politik Domestik.

Background

On February 24, 2022, for the first time, the Russian Federation launched a military attack on Kiev, the capital city of Ukraine which then marked the beginning of the war in Ukraine. This is the culmination of the long conflict between the two countries which actually started in 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimea region. Until July 2023, the war had killed more than 9,000 people and injured around 16,000 people.¹ In addition to that, the war has caused migration of more than 6.1 million of Ukrainian people mostly to neighboring European countries.² The impact of the war is also apparent in various sectors in forms of public infrastructure damage, economic collapse, global economic uncertainty, and food and energy crises.

Apart from the huge and multifaceted consequences of the war, it has also triggered an intense debate on foreign policy field. A number of middle-power countries have shown their diplomatic efforts to end the war or at least facilitate the negotiation process such as those carried out by Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Denmark. Surprisingly, Indonesia, which is known as a non-aligned country, has taken an active stance towards the conflict. It was shown by active foreign policy activities in various bilateral and multilateral settings including the visit made by President Joko Widodo to Ukraine and Russia in June 2022 which became the first Asian leader who made a peaceful mission trip.

1 "Ukraine: civilian casualty update" OHCHR, published on 31 July 2023, diakses pada 15 Agustus 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/07/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-31-july-2023>.

2 "Ukraine Refugee Situation", OHCHR, last modified on 6 September, diakses 10 September 2023, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

The behavior of the Indonesian government as well as its foreign policy in general have become more intriguing due to the war in Ukraine coinciding with Indonesia's leadership at the Group of 20 (G20) and ASEAN. Moreover, it is interesting because Indonesia has long been considered as a non-aligned country since the post-Independence era, continued during the Cold War and New Order, and lasted until now in the post-Soeharto era.³ The war in Ukraine also has grown into a narrow confrontation between the United States block, including its Western allies and Russia block. It has sparked strategic dilemma for Indonesian foreign policy. The articulation of the concept of free and active or shortly termed as bebas-aktif foreign policy is in great question. This study will dive deeper into Indonesia's foreign policy analysis specifically in facing Russia-Ukraine war.

Academic study on foreign policy toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict are relatively easy to find in Indonesian literature. Tiara and Mas'udi deeply investigated Joko Widodo's reason to visit Ukraine and Russia which they revealed as an effort to gain economic interest, build a positive image and as preparation for the G20 Summit.⁴ While works of Sudjatmiko, Simatupang and Panggabean focussed on the G20 Summit as an articulation of free and active foreign policy on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.⁵ With a different angle,

3 Anna Leiber, "A Foreign Policy of Non-Alignment? Indonesia's position during the Cold War", GRIN Verlag: Seminar Paper, 2014, accessed on August 1, 2023, <https://www.grin.com/document/282696>

4 Tiara, D. T., & Mas'udi, S. Y. F. "Diplomasi Indonesia dalam Konflik Rusia - Ukraina: Sebuah Kajian Tentang Soft- Power." *Journal of Political Issues*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2023): 74-88. <https://doi.org/10.33019/jpi.v4i.2.95>.

5 See Sudjatmiko, Totok., Meilinda Sari Yayasan, Firman Budianto, Tri Rainny Syafarani, "The Middle Power Role of Indonesia in G20 Amidst Geopolitical

Darmawan analyzes the war impact on Indonesian economic and trade performance.⁶ However, it did not portray comprehensive findings on foreign policy attitude toward the conflict.

To fill this academic gap, this study aims to comprehensively and deeply examine Indonesian foreign policy behavior regarding the war in Ukraine. With that in mind, the research question of this study is twofold. First, how does Indonesia articulate the doctrine of bebas-aktif foreign policy on Russia-Ukraine conflict. Second, what are the reasons behind that foreign policy behavior? Then, to interpret the course of behavior and its motives, this article will rely on the role theory of foreign policy analysis. In the first section of this article, bebas-aktif foreign policy will be described in order to know the changing interpretation among Indonesian leaders. After that, this study will shortly review the role theory of foreign policy to find the desired position of Indonesia during the conflict.

Literature Review

Indonesia's Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy

To begin with, Indonesia's foreign policy has perennially become an attractive subject among foreign policy analysts and international relations scholars. The initial reference was the speech delivered by the first Indonesia's Vice-President Mohammad Hatta in September 1948 titled 'Rowing between Two Reefs' which then simply means as free

and active or bebas-aktif in Bahasa. And under the spirit of removing colonialism, Indonesia sought to secure independence from foreign domination where all sovereign states are bound by international laws. This Hatta's doctrine was developed under the context of major power rivalry between the United States and the Uni Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Bebas or independence means that Indonesia is not aligned with any alliances in global politics. While aktif means Indonesia's willingness to enhance its role in the international community.⁷

Bebas-aktif policy had experienced different articulation over the post-independence period until the New Order era. In the 1950s, bebas-aktif principle laid down the Indonesian autonomy outlook in international politics by not aligning with a particular bloc. At the same time, the principle also served as a government strategy to prevent the two block's influence on domestic disunity.⁸ Moreover, Indonesia also firstly aligned with internasional order in accordance with its 60th full-fledged membership at the United Nations in September 1950.

A decade later, under the so-called Guided Democracy, Indonesia took a more radical articulation of bebas-aktif foreign policy.⁹ It pursued a more distant connection both from the U.S and Soviet Union by co-initiating the establishment of what has been labeled as the 'third world'. In September 1961, Indonesia's President Soekarno co-founded the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), under the spirit of anti neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism, together with Yugoslav's President Joisp Broz Tito, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Egyptian President Gamar Abdel Nasser,

Disruption of The Russia-Ukraine Conflict." *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 19, No.2 (2022): 93-110; and Simatupang, Helga Yohana and Michael Romulus Panggabean. "The Implementation of Indonesia's Free and Active Foreign Policy Over the Russia-Ukraine War During Indonesia's G20 Presidency" in D. Mutiarin et al. (Eds.): ICOSI-HESS (2022): 590-602, 2022. https://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-494069-65-7_49.

6 Darmawan, Arif., Nairobi, Roby Rakhmadi, Ghania Atiqasani. "The Impact of the Russia and Ukraine War on Indonesian Economic and Trade Performance." *Jurnal Ekonomi dan Studi Pembangunan*, Vol. 15, No.1 (2023): ISSN 2086-1575 E-ISSN 2502-7115.

7 Muhammad Tri Andika, "the Role of Indonesia in ASEAN under Jokowi's Pro People Democracy", *INDOCOMPAC Prosiding Seminar*, 2016: 622-631.

8 Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia's BebasAktif Foreign Policy and the 'Security Agreement' with Australia", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.51, No.2 (1997): 232, DOI: 10.1080/10357719708445212.

9 Sukma, "Indonesia's bebas aktif foreign policy", 233.

Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah. It mirrored a more active engagement in international politics.

Although some deviations were abound during Soekarno era, *bebas-aktif* doctrine had become an identity for Indonesia's foreign politics to exert its anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, sovereignty, and respect to international laws as well as UN Charter. On the contrary, entering the New Order era, Indonesia tended to refrain from taking more engagements in international politics. President Soeharto sought to devote its foreign politics for the national interest, namely the economic development agenda. At that point, the Soeharto era pursued economic diplomacy which actually projected to attract more investment from the US and West economic power.

In 2024, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono came to power and brought a different foreign policy approach. His administration attempted to exert a more outward-looking foreign policy by taking more active engagement in international politics, referring to doctrine called "thousand friends-zero enemies".¹⁰ The administration also demonstrated a status-seeking behavior as a middle power country in international politics.¹¹ In this regard, Yudhoyono's administration tended to capitalize the country's stability, successful democratization, as well as robust economic growth to take a greater role at regional and global level.

In 2014, Joko Widodo or simply Jokowi, the former Jakarta Governor came to power and became the first civilian President of the Republic of Indonesia. His administration branded Indonesian positions in the regional and global arena as Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF)/Global Maritime Axis or Poros

Maritim Dunia with its strong pursuit of maritime strategic power.¹² The term indicated a quest for more active foreign policy as a security balancer between major power rivalry.

By contrast, the resonance of the GMF gradually faded away in the second terms of Jokowi's presidency. Placing domestic needs as priority, Jokowi pursued a more pragmatic and economic-oriented view of international engagement for better equitable economic development. It is called *pro-people* diplomacy which places people's interest as a center of Indonesia's foreign diplomacy.¹³ Under the Jokowi administration, foreign policy agenda served as an instrument to attract foreign investment and gain national economic benefit for the sake of the national development agenda. Unlike Yudhoyono, Jokowi shows a less intensive status-seeking behavior in foreign policy arena, more pragmatic, and inward-looking.¹⁴

It can be concluded from over the course of Indonesian political history that *bebas-aktif* foreign policy has been enacted in different styles according to different presidential periods. But, the Indonesian outlook strongly affirms the unwavering commitment to sovereignty and independence of all states, equality under international laws, and peaceful resolution through multilateral and international cooperation.¹⁵ In addition to that, historically, Indonesia perceives great powers with suspicion and views them as non-benign actors in international politics. Hence,

10 Andika, "the Role of Indonesia in ASEAN", 4.

11 Moch Faisal Karim, "Middle power, status-seeking, and role conceptions: the cases of Indonesia and South Korea", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, (2018), doi:10.1080/10357718.2018.1443428.

12 Sambhi, Natalie. "Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis': Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?". *Security Challenges*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2015): 39-56.

13 Andika, "the Role of Indonesia in ASEAN", 7.

14 See Moch Faisal Karim, "Middle Power, Status Seeking and Role Conception; and Kornelius Purba, "Jokowi's foreign policy comes late, but internationally impactful." *The Jakarta Post*, (November 6, 2022), accessed on September 9, 2023, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/11/25/jokowis-foreign-policy-comes-late-but-internationally-impactful.html>.

15 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, "The rise of the Asian middle powers: Indonesia's conceptions of international order." *International Affairs*, (2023): 1464. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiaad167.

the foreign policy doctrine is also free from diktats of great powers.¹⁶

Role Theory of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

Role theory has long been considered as a helpful tool in foreign policy analysis. Specifically, role theory helps foreign policy analysts to reveal the roles that individuals, states, and other actors enact on the international scene.¹⁷ It reveals the role of governments or states in international systems. The earliest study of role theory mostly refers to a seminal work by Holsti's article on national role conception of foreign policy published in 1970. In his article, role theory offers a framework for describing national role performance and role conceptions and including the study to explore the various sources during role conception.¹⁸

In his work, Holsti identified four important concepts in role theory: role performance, national role conception, role prescription, and position. *First*, role performance.¹⁹ It broadly refers to attitudes, decisions, and actions of governments and it can be shortly conceptualized as recurrent foreign policy behavior of governments. It covers all patterns of a country's behavior toward other states or international politics.²⁰ *Second*, self-identified and leader-driven national role conceptions. In this stage, leaders interpret their own conception of role according to multiple

factors. It may also be shaped by the conception of their own state sovereignty,²¹ development of domestic interests and public credibility,²² or ever-changing of international audience.²³ Some studies mentioned the importance of leader's personality factors in shaping national role conception and role of political ideology.²⁴

Third, role prescriptions which stem either from internal or external environment factors or combination of them. It means that national leaders articulate their respective national prescription which can be in forms of national identity, rules, or doctrine according to their conception of national role. *Fourth*, position which can be associated as settings where action takes place. Further in his work, Holsti's role theory stressed the interaction between role performance and role prescriptions.²⁵

Early proponents of role theory often relied on the structuralism approach which tended to emphasize the dominant role of structure in shaping a leader's orientation in foreign policy. Nevertheless, more recent

16 Anne Marie Murphy, "Ukraine war highlights differences between Indonesian and US foreign policy frameworks." *East Asia Forum*, 5 Agustus 2022, accessed on Januari 10, 2023, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/08/05/ukraine-war-highlights-differences-between-indonesian-and-u-s-foreign-policy-frameworks/>

17 Leslie E. Wesner and Cameron G. Thies, "Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2014): 411-436. <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12149>.

18 Kalevi Jaako Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.14, No.3 (September 1970): 247, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584>

19 Holsti, "National Role Conception", 240

20 Holsti, "National Role Conception", 245

21 Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, and Kai Oppermann. "Role Theory, Foreign Policy, and the Social Construction of Sovereignty: Brexit Stage Right", *Global Studies Quarterly*, Vol.1, No.1 (March 2021), ksab001, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab001>.

22 Juliet Kaarbo, "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 17, No. 2, (June 2015): 189-216, <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12213>; and Fazeiro, Bernardo Teles "Keeping a Promise: Roles, Audiences and Credibility in International Relations." *International Relations*, Vol.35, No. 2, (2021):299-319. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820961816>.

23 Moch Faisal Karim, "Middle Power, Status Seeking and Role Conception,

24 Leslie E. Wehner, and Cameron G Thies, "Leader Influence in Role Selection Choices: Fulfilling Role Theory's Potential for Foreign Policy Analysis", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 2021): 1424-1441, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab014>; see also Feliciano Da Sa Guimaraes, and E Silva, "Far-right populism and foreign policy identity: Jair Bolsonaro's ultra-conservatism and the new politics of alignment", *International Affairs*, Vol.97, No.2, (2021) 345-363; doi: 10.1093/ia/iaa220; and also Oliver Turner & Juliet Kaarbo. "Predictably unpredictable: Trump's personality and approach towards China." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 3, (2021): 452-471, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2021.1879018.

25 Holsti, "National Role Conceptions", 239

role theorists have shifted their attention to constructivism perspective where national role in international arena is formed by agency perception.²⁶ In this respect, the agency is perceived to have a certain degree of authority in conceptualizing foreign policy behavior. It means that the foreign policy actors, whether it is the president, prime minister, or foreign minister, have stronger capability to enact certain foreign policy actions according to his or her personal calculation.

Apart from that angle, academic study on the country's role in international systems has become varied. A number of researchers have departed from the discussion of role performance and role conception to analyze the dynamic of role conflict.²⁷ However, there is little work paid attention to how role prescriptions are constructed in certain ways during the national role conception processes and become foundation for foreign policy activities in world politics. Referring to Holsti's classification of role theory, the study of role prescription and role conception become crucial. In the case of Indonesia, analyzing Indonesia's foreign policy toward Russia-Ukraine conflict is inextricable from those two roles' interaction.

Research Method

In this study, the author is guided by role theory of foreign policy to reveal the foreign policy behavior and factors behind that. To that end, qualitative research methods relying on textual data are treated as the main object of analysis. Textual data comprises of policy documents published by Indonesian authority, the UN Secretary General office and also all related archives from relevant international

and regional organizations. This study put emphasize on narrative interpretation, following the fact that role are often applied in narratives to show about particular actors and subject positions.²⁸ Analysis of textual documents will be specifically targeted to role performance and role conception analysis. The topic analysis will be limited to Indonesian foreign policy related to Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Built upon Holsti's role theorisation, this study will limit the analysis on role performance to recurring decisions and actions by the Indonesian government in multilateral events including UN General Assembly and G20 Summit, parliamentary diplomacy; and bilateral relations with Ukraine and Russia. On the other hand, role conception will be analyzed in the way the foreign policy makers interpret and articulate bebas-aktif policy doctrine as the most fundamental role prescription in Indonesian foreign engagement.

Position at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

Indonesia has shown keen interest in the Russian military attack against Ukraine that started on 24th of February 2022. Through an official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia underlined three points: first, adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and International Law, including respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; second, the military attack on Ukraine is unacceptable due to its detrimental impact to the people's lives and regional as well as global peace and stability; third, hostilities must be ceased and all parties to put forward peaceful resolution through diplomacy.²⁹

26 Marijke Breuning, "Role Theory in Foreign Policy", *Politics* (2017) <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.334>.

27 Song, W., & Fürst, R. "China's bid for international leadership in Central and Eastern Europe: role conflict and policy responses", *International Relations*, (2022) <https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221082871>.

28 Fazendeiro, "Keeping a Promise", 299-319

29 Official Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, published on 25 February 2022, <https://kemlu.go.id/vancouver/en/news/17861/indonesian-government-statement-regarding-the-military-attack-in-ukraine>, diakses pada 2 Juni 2023.

These three principles served as framework for the subsequent foreign policy behavior especially in the UN system.

Under the framework of UN systems, Indonesia has articulated its foreign policy behavior mainly through the UN General Assembly (UNGA) session. Indonesia has become a member of the United Nations since September 25, 1950 and became the 60th Member of the UN. A year later, Indonesia then became a member of the UN General Assembly in 1951. In 1971, Indonesia's representative at the UN Adam Malik was appointed as the 26th President of the UN General Assembly. It marked the most significant Indonesia's acceptance in an international forum since its independence.

The UNGA is the UN primary policy making organ which provides a multilateral forum in discussing various international issues. Various international issues are taken into general debate of the UNGA. Voting is the main mechanism of policy decision at the UNGA. The institution imposed the one country one vote system where all 193 Member States have an equal vote. While decisions on international peace, security, admitting new members and the UN budget are decided through two-thirds majority.³⁰ While other issues are decided by simple majority or consensus.³²

Although the UNGA resolution is not legally-binding, it is politically significant which mirrors the country's foreign policy. On the war in Ukraine, the UNGA has held the 11th Emergency Special Session on Ukraine six times since the war erupted in February 2022. Indonesia has participated in four of six

30 "Working of the General Assembly" General Assembly of the United Nations, diakses pada 13 Agustus 2023, published at <https://www.un.org/en/ga/>.

32 "Model United Nations", accessed on July 8, 2023 <https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/general-assembly#:~:text=Each%20Member%20State%20has%20one,consensus%20without%20a%20formal%20vote.>

voting sessions as follows: (Table 1)³³

Less than a week after the first Russian military attacked Ukrainian territory in February 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution on "Aggression against Ukraine" which was then followed by Resolution on "Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine". Indonesia has voted in favor of both resolutions reciting the military attack as the violation of international laws although an official statement from Indonesian Foreign Ministry did not mention Russia. At the same time, due to the increasing number of deaths, the second resolution was considered a human rights violation. However, Indonesian academics criticized the decision for being too close and pro-West in terms of condemnation.³⁴

Unlike the two previous resolutions on aggression and humanitarian consequences, Indonesia has decided to abstain from voting on the resolution regarding Western aspiration to eliminate Russia from the UN Security Council namely "Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council". The Resolution was approved by 93 countries or about 48,1% of all UN Members. Indonesia avoided supporting the resolution based on the premise that the suspension will be counterproductive with the effort to open dialogue to end the war. It would also undermine the credibility of the UN systems in handling the conflict. It is clearly obvious that Indonesian foreign policy is consistently promoting engagement instead of isolation.³⁵

33 Emergency Special Sessions - UN General Assembly Resolutions Tables - Research Guides at United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, accessed on July 13, 2023, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/emergency>.

34 Saptohutomo, "Setujui Resolusi PBB Soal Krisis Rusia-Ukraina, Indonesia dinilai mengekor AS", 3 March 2022, diakses pada 13 Juli 2023 <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/03/03/17070291/setujui-resolusi-pbb-soal-krisis-rusia-ukraina-indonesia-dinilai-mengekor-as>.

35 Anne Marie Murphy, "Ukraine war highlights

Table 1. The 11th Emergency Special Session Ukraine

No	Date	Number	Title	Vote (in favor- against- abstain)	Indonesia Position
1	2 March 2022	A/RES/ES-11/1	Aggression against Ukraine	141-5-35	In Favor
2	24 March 2022	A/RES/ES-11/2	Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine	140-5-38	In Favor
3	7 April 2022	A/RES/ES-11/3	Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council	93-24-58	Abstain
4	12 October 2022	A/RES/ES-11/4	Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nation	143-5-35	In Favor
5	14 November 2022	A/RES/ES-11/5	Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine	94-14-13	Abstain
6	23 February 2022	A/RES/ES-11/6	Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine	141-7-32	In Favor

Source: adopted UN Digital Library System

Next, Indonesia decided to abstain from voting on the Resolution on "Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine " which was adopted on 14 November 2022. Several emerging countries also abstain from the voting such as India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Nepal, Pakistan, South Africa and Sri Lanka. Together with 73 countries, Indonesia abstained from this resolution which urged Russia to be fully responsible to make remedy and reparation for Ukraine (A/RES/ES-11/5). It showed a staunch position of Indonesian foreign policy to not take side on one party.

Indonesia was among the countries who supported "the Resolution on Territorial

integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nation". The Resolution reaffirms the commitment to protect sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Indonesia strongly opposed the Russian-led referendum over four Ukrainian regions: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, dan Kherson. The referendum breached international laws and the UN Charter. Moreover, Indonesia believed that the annexation would put the mission of dialogue and diplomacy in difficulty.³⁶ Hence, Indonesia took a firm stance with the territorial integrity of Ukraine, pursuant to the UN Charter.

Indonesia voted in favor of the 6th UNGA

differences between Indonesian and US foreign policy frameworks." *East Asia Forum*, 5 Agustus 2022, accessed on January 10, 2023, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/08/05/ukraine-war-highlights-differences-between-indonesian-and-u-s-foreign-policy-frameworks/>

36 Heru Andriyanto, "Indonesia Won't Recognize Russia's Claim of Four Ukrainian Regions", *Jakarta Globe*, 2 October 2022, diakses pada 2 Agustus 2023, <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-wont-recognize-russias-claim-of-four-ukrainian-regions.>

resolution the "Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine". It called for an urgent, immediate, and complete withdrawal of the Russian military from the territory of Ukraine (A/RES/ES-11/6). Indonesia has consistently conveyed the message to end the war and hostilities including creation of sustainable peace according to the principle of the UN Charters. Peaceful negotiation and diplomacy was conveyed by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, instead of a zero-sum game approach.³⁷

Presidency at the G20

The war in Ukraine, together with many other geopolitical challenges, has become a major context of Indonesia's presidency at the Group of 20, the group comprising 19 of the world's largest economies and the European Union. Under the theme "Recover Together, Recover Stronger, Indonesia hosted more than 40 of G20 related meetings involving 10 working groups and 12 engagement groups. In relation to the war in Ukraine, the two most striking issues during the G20 Indonesia was: first, massive Western pressure to exclude Russia from the Group, and second, the aspiration of most G20 leaders to take the issue of Russia-Ukraine conflict as the main theme of declaration. It became a test case for Indonesia's bebas-aktif foreign policy.

The primary debate on the G20 meetings was the Western pressure on Indonesia to exclude Russia from all G20 events. The U.S President and The Secretary of the Treasury had warned Indonesia regarding Russia's participation in the

Group's meetings. They urged Indonesia to exclude Russia from the Group's meeting. There was a pressure to allow Ukraine to attend the meeting to replace Russia. Indonesia has responded with careful consideration by keeping the G20 Summit as planned. The Joko Widodo administration eventually decided to remain impartial by inviting Vladimir Putin to attend the meeting as usual procedure. At the same time, Indonesia invited the Ukrainian leader to come to G20 as guest of the host where President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented his 10 points of Plan.³⁸

The G20 Summit yielded the G20 Bali Leader's Declaration which reflect the common agreement among G20 Members. Interestingly, the Declaration only mentioned 2 of 52 paragraph on Russia-Ukraine war in a different angle. It was apparent that Indonesia has capability to manage the G20 leadership as usual forum that not being hijacked by the West-Russia conflict. Indonesia evidently succeeded to agree on several issues such as global health architecture, digital economic transformation, and energy transition which germane to developing country's interest.³⁹

The Paragraph 3 of the Declaration contains three stressing points. First, it clearly framed the huge impact of the war in Ukraine for the global economy. Second, it reflects unequivocal condemnation of the Russian aggression against Ukraine by most G20 Members while it acknowledged the diverging views among others Members. Third, it urges the complete withdrawal of Russia's military from the territory of Ukraine. As the host country, Indonesia endeavored to create a balanced position on this paragraph by taking both sides into one paragraph.

37 "Posisi Indonesia atas Rancangan Resolusi "UN Charter Principles Underlying a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting Peace in Ukraine" pada Sidang Darurat Khusus MU PBB ke-11" Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 24 February 2023, diakses pada 15 Juli 2023 at <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/4486/berita/posisi-indonesia-atas-rancangan-resolusi-un-charter-principles-underlying-a-comprehensive-just-and-lasting-peace-in-ukraine-pada-sidang-darurat-khusus-mu-pbb-ke-11>.

38 "Explainer: What is Zelenskyy's 10-point peace plan?" *Reuters*, 28 December 2022, accessed on 23 Agustus 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/>.

39 Murphy, "Ukraine War Highlight",

Paragraph 2: "This year, we have also witnessed the war in Ukraine further adversely impact the global economy. There was a discussion on the issue. We reiterated our national positions as expressed in other fora, including the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, which, in Resolution No. ES-11/1 dated 2 March 2022, as adopted by majority vote (141 votes for, 5 against, 35 abstentions, 12 absent) deploras in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and demands its complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine. Most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine and stressed it is causing immense human suffering and exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy - constraining growth, increasing inflation, disrupting supply chains, heightening energy and food insecurity, and elevating financial stability risks. There were other views and different assessments of the situation and sanctions. Recognizing that the G20 is not the forum to resolve security issues, we acknowledge that security issues can have significant consequences for the global economy." (G20 Bali Leader's Declaration, 2022).

With reference to the food security issue, the Paragraph 8 of the Declaration contained more on the importance of food supply guarantee from Russia through the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Paragraph 3: "We welcome the Türkiye and UN-brokered two Istanbul Agreements signed on 22 July 2022 and consisting of the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports (Black Sea Grain Initiative) and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the Secretariat of the United Nations on Promoting Russian Food Products and Fertilizers to the World Markets, on the unimpeded deliveries of grain, foodstuffs, and fertilizers/inputs from Ukraine and the Russian Federation, to ease tension and prevent global food insecurity and hunger in developing countries. We emphasize the importance of their full, timely and continued implementation by all relevant stakeholders, as well as the UN Secretary-General's calls for continuation of these efforts by the Parties." (G20 Bali Leader's Declaration, 2022).

Fourth, President Joko Widodo has endeavored to persuade both Western leaders and Russia to end the war in Ukraine citing respect to international laws and the United Nations Charter. The Declaration squarely referred to international law, multilateral system, and the UN Charter to maintain peace and stability. It is stated that diplomacy and dialogue must be resolved through diplomacy

and dialogue.

Paragraph 4. It is essential to uphold international law and the multilateral system that safeguards peace and stability. This includes defending all the Purposes and Principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and adhering to international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians and infrastructure in armed conflicts. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible. The peaceful resolution of conflicts, efforts to address crises, as well as diplomacy and dialogue, are vital. Today's era must not be of war. (G20 Bali Leader's Declaration, 2022).

It can be inferred from the political dynamic of pre-Summit of the G20 that Indonesia had endeavored to seek a win-win solution between accommodating the aspiration to exclude Russia from the group and keep Russia in. In the context of global power confrontation, Indonesia showed its middle power interconnector role by raising the aspiration of developing and less developed countries who have been greatly impacted by the war in the group of G20 forum.⁴⁰ In addition to that, Indonesia also endeavored to protect the G20 Summit for not being exclusive for Russia-Ukraine issue debate and at the same time was not being negligent of the impact of the war.

Joko Widodo's Visit to Russian and Ukraine

Indonesia has long been considered as a neutral country which historically connected to both Russia and then Ukraine. Indonesia has officially opened diplomatic relations with the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) since 3 February 1950 which then revived along with the emergence of the Russian Federation in 1991. Likewise, Indonesia was among the first countries to recognize the independence of Ukraine in December 1991 and have formalized diplomatic relations since 1992. Currently, the diplomatic ties between Indonesia with Russia and Ukraine have advanced significantly.

Indonesia was the close brother of Uni Soviet where its intimate relations peaked in

⁴⁰ See Sudjatmiko, "The Middle Power Role of Indonesia"

the period of 1950s and 1960s. During the time, both country leaders made a mutual visit. In September 1956, President Soekarno visited Moscow and in February 1960, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev had also visited Indonesia.⁴¹ The Uni Soviet provided significant support for Indonesia at international level by welcoming the Indonesia independence, acknowledging Indonesian sovereignty, opposing colonialism, and condemning Dutch military aggression in the UN Security Council.⁴² The Soviet played a significant role in supplying military equipment and development assistance in the 1950-1965 period.

The close relations between two countries continued when the Russian Federation was established in 1991. Until 2023, the multidimensional relations between two countries have advanced in a positive trajectory. Indonesia exports Palm Oil, Coconut Oil, and Large Flat-Rolled Stainless Steel to Russia, while Russia exports Semi-Finished Iron, Coal Briquettes, and Potassic Fertilizers to Indonesia.⁴³ Russia is one of Indonesia's largest trading partners and sources of investment, with an average trade balance in the last 5 years of US\$ 2.3 billion.⁴⁴ Indonesia aspires to become a strategic partner of Russia and has requested a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). It marks

41 Ranga Pandu Asmara Jingga, "Indonesia-Russia: the secret of brotherhood". *Antaraneews*, 5 October 2022, accessed on 26 July 2023, <https://en.antaraneews.com/news/253257/indonesia-russia-the-secrets-of-brotherhood>.

42 "Hubungan Bilateral antara Indonesia dan Rusia". Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, accessed on 14 July 2023, <https://kemlu.go.id/moscow/id/read/hubungan-bilateral-antara-indonesia-dan-rusia/392/etc-menu>.

43 "Russian - Indonesian Trade Up 50% In 2022" Russia Briefing, 19 December 2022, accessed 12 June 2023, <https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russian-indonesian-trade-up-50-in-2022.html/>.

44 "Indonesia-Russia committed to remove trade barriers between two countries". Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, published on March 4, 2021, at <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2218/berita/indonesia-russia-committed-to-remove-trade-barriers-between-two-countries>.

how strategic the relationship is for Russia and Indonesia.

Parallel with that, Indonesia had maintained close relations with Ukraine long before the war began. Indonesia was among the first countries to recognize the Ukraine establishment in December 1991. Now, Indonesia is one of the biggest Ukraine's trading partners in ASEAN which will reach US\$1,01 billion in 2020.⁴⁵ More than 60% of Ukrainian export product to Indonesia is wheat, followed by fertilizers, iron and steel products as well as arms and weaponry. While at the same time, Indonesia mainly exports palm oil, nickel, natural rubber, paper, and coffee. This strong alliance became a main feature of robust bilateral ties between Indonesia and Ukraine.

With this in mind, it is not surprising that the Jokowi administration pays more attention to the Russia and Ukraine conflict. In terms of the bilateral cooperation framework, Indonesia's President Joko Widodo is the only Asian leader who made a visit to Ukraine and Russia after the war broke in February 2022. President Joko Widodo visited Ukraine through Poland on 29 June 2022 and met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy before continuing the visit to Russia to meet President Vladimir Putin. The visit has acclaimed international recognition and triggered a positive image at national level.

The primary topic of the meeting with Ukrainian and Russian leaders was mainly about the issue of potential food crises especially in Indonesia and developing countries. Ukraine is among the top ten global wheat suppliers to the Indonesian food industry together with Russia. The war in Ukraine had disrupted food and fertilizer supply chains that impacted million people in the world,

45 "Empat Kesepakatan Berhasil Dicapai Indonesia dan Ukraina", Sekretariat Negara, 5 Agustus 2016, accessed on 22 Agustus 2023, https://setneg.go.id/baca/index/empat_kesepakatan_berhasil_dicapai_indonesia_dan_ukraina.

including in developing countries. In this point, it can be seen that Jokowi's visit was primarily in an effort to hinder the economic and trade impact of the war. It was mostly about domestic gain to secure wheat supply, to gain support for the G20 presidency, and also to prove domestic political legitimacy.⁴⁶ Jokowi cited the importance of the UN body to help guarantee the safe passage for food export in order to prevent hunger in developing countries.

President Jokowi reaffirmed the value of peace and humanity as one of Indonesia's foreign policies to hinder deeper crises in energy, food, and global supply-chain. To that end, Jokowi offered his readiness to become bridge-builder between two parties and facilitate the communication of both Russia-Ukraine leaders.⁴⁷ More than that, Joko Widodo claimed to convey Zelensky's message for President Putin although this statement was denied by the Ukrainian President. However, it mirrored the eagerness of Jokowi administration to engage more in resolving international conflict.

Parliamentary Diplomacy

In parallel with the government's active engagement on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia also undertakes parliamentary

diplomatic activities concerning the issue. Indonesia had three momentum for exerting parliamentary diplomacy where the House of Representatives served as the host of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) General Assembly, host of the Parliament of Group 20 (P20) Summit, and the President and Host of the General Assembly of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA).

Indonesia hosted the 144th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) General Assembly in Nusa Dua which was held in March 2022, a month after Russia's first military attacked Ukraine. The General Assembly of the IPU held twice a year and Indonesia hosted the event amid the beginning of the war. Both the Russian and Ukrainian parliament are members of the IPU. Although their delegation did not come to the Session, on that occasion, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine took a prompt reaction to Russia's attack by proposing an emergency item condemning Russia titled "Russian and Belarusian Aggression Against Ukraine". It was proposed on 16 March 2022 as part of its effort to mobilize parliamentary actions to condemn Russia. However, the resolution was rejected by most IPU Delegates. Then, Indonesia proposed a new emergency item titled "The role of parliaments in supporting a peaceful resolution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict" as an alternative to the Ukraine proposal which had been considered as biased and did represent the whole view of global parliamentarians.

Indonesia has struggled to find the middle way by taking a more neutral narrative and more focus on seeking peaceful resolution instead of condemnation and blaming one party. Indonesia's proposal was eventually merged with the emergency item proposal from the Parliament of New Zealand. The Assembly then adopted a Resolution on "Peaceful resolution of the war in Ukraine, respecting international law, the Charter of

46 Radityo Dharmaputro, "Jokowi's visits to Russia and Ukraine are more about domestic gains than the global interest", *The Conversation*, 6 Juli 2022, accessed on August 7, 2023, <https://theconversation.com/jokowis-visits-to-russia-and-ukraine-are-more-about-domestic-gains-than-the-global-interest-186217>

47 "Bertemu Dengan Presiden Putin Presiden Jokowi Indonesia Siap Menjembatani Komunikasi Rusia Ukraina". Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, published on July 1, 2022 at [https://www.google.com/search?q=Bertemu+Dengan+Presiden+Putin+Presiden+Jokowi+Indonesia+Siap+Menjembatani+Komunikasi+Rusia+Ukraina+%7C+Portal+Kementerian+Luar+Negeri+Republik+Indonesia+\(kemlu.go.id\)&aq= Bertemu+Dengan+Presiden+Putin+Presiden+Jokowi+Indonesia+Siap+Menjembatani+Komunikasi+Rusia+Ukraina+%7C+Portal+Kementerian+Luar+Negeri+Republik+Indonesia+\(kemlu.go.id\)&aqs=chrome..69i57.289j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8](https://www.google.com/search?q=Bertemu+Dengan+Presiden+Putin+Presiden+Jokowi+Indonesia+Siap+Menjembatani+Komunikasi+Rusia+Ukraina+%7C+Portal+Kementerian+Luar+Negeri+Republik+Indonesia+(kemlu.go.id)&aq= Bertemu+Dengan+Presiden+Putin+Presiden+Jokowi+Indonesia+Siap+Menjembatani+Komunikasi+Rusia+Ukraina+%7C+Portal+Kementerian+Luar+Negeri+Republik+Indonesia+(kemlu.go.id)&aqs=chrome..69i57.289j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8)

Tabel 2. Composition of IPU Task Force on Russia-Ukraine Conflict

No	Geopolitical Groups	Country Members	Representatives
1	Africa	Namibia South Africa	Speaker of the National Assembly of Namibia Speaker of the National Assembly of South Africa
2	Arab	Uni Arab Emirates	Chairman of the Defense Affairs, Interior & Foreign Affairs Committee, UAE Federal National Council
3	Asia Pasific	Indonesia	Chair of the Committee for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation, the Indonesia House of Representatives
4	Eurasia	Kazakhstan	Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security of Mazhilis of Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan
5	Twelve Plus Group (Western Europe+North America)	Netherlands, the replaced by Belgium Israel	Deputy Speaker of the Senate of the Netherlands, replaced by the Speaker of the Senate of Belgium Parliament. Member of Knesset of Israeli Parliament/ Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Israel
6	Latin America	Uruguay	President of the General Assembly of Uruguay/ Vice-President of Uruguay

the United Nations and territorial integrity". In that resolution, Indonesia initiated an establishment of the IPU Task Force on Russia-Ukraine conflict. It has been clearly stipulated in the last paragraph of the Resolution as follows:

"Calls upon the IPU to use its good offices to encourage dialogue between parliamentarians in both countries in support of diplomatic efforts under the framework of a rules-based international order respecting the principles of sovereignty and complete avoidance of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation and recommends that the IPU establish a Task Force on the situation in Ukraine to facilitate the role of parliaments in formulating feasible peaceful solutions."

The IPU Task Force aims to realize three missions. In the immediate term, it seeks to achieve a complete cease-fire to stop human casualties and destruction of property and infrastructure. In the medium term, IPU Task Force aims to contribute to confidence building measures that will achieve long-term cessation of hostilities, organize humanitarian

assistance and other assistance for Ukrainians and Russians. In the longer term, the Task Force aims to assist the two parliaments of Ukraine and Russia to establish and strengthen mechanisms for ongoing dialogue in order to explain the causes of the conflict and identify measures for addressing these causes in the context of achieving sustainable peace; and work to re-establish peaceful sustainable relationships in the region.

Indonesia was appointed to become part of the IPU Task Force on Russia-Ukraine representing the Asia-Pacific geopolitical group. Composition of IPU Task Force Members were appointed based on gender-balanced and according to 6 different geopolitical groups of IPU membership.

From the IPU General Assembly, it can be inferred that the Indonesian parliament was outspoken in voicing the need to pursue a dialogue and parliamentary diplomacy to end

the war and create long-lasting peace for both parties.

Then, Indonesia exercised its foreign policy during the processes to the 8th G20 Parliamentary Speakers' Summit (P20). Held in Jakarta on 5-7 October 2022, the P20 Summit was attended by 15 out of 20 country's parliament where the Russian top parliamentary delegation included. Hand in hand with the G20 Summit, Ukraine was also invited as the guest of the host. Under the theme "Responsive Parliament for Sustainable Recovery", the P20 Summit discussed four main sub-topics namely sustainable development and green economy, food and energy security, effective parliament, and social inclusion. The issue of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was commonly addressed mostly by Western countries.

The direct confrontation between Russia and US-led Western alliance occurred during the Summit. Western countries took the opportunity to condemn Russia for its "aggression" to Ukraine. At the same time, Russian top delegation harnessed the Summit to disprove Western propaganda and denied the necessity to respect to rules-based international order which is claimed to be Western-heavy. The debate heated during the Joint Communique Session. Facilitated by the IPU, Indonesia endeavored to bridge both party's aspiration and led out from the deadlock. Due to complex political situation, the P20 Summit ended with Chair's Summary instead of Joint Declaration. The Summary clearly mentioned the diametrically opposing views among parliament leaders regarding the war in Ukraine (P20 Chair Summary, 2022).

Then, Indonesia became the President of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) and hosted the 44th AIPA General Assembly in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 5-10 August 2023. It became the next show for Indonesian parliamentary diplomacy in

relation to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Both of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Federation Council of Russian Federation attended the AIPA Assembly as Observer. The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia provided delegation of the two parliaments a chance to give remark during the plenary session. In addition to that, the House of chaired the AIPA Dialogue with Observer Parliaments including with the Ukraine and Russian Parliament. It signaled the continuous strong ties between ASEAN country's parliament with the both Russia and Ukrainian side.

However, Indonesia seemed to refrain from mentioning the conflict of Ukraine and Russia in any details in the Joint Communique of the 44th AIPA General Assembly. The communique expressed hope for a swift and peaceful resolution to the conflict in Ukraine and it was reaffirmed that ASEAN Member States would not take sides in US-China relations. Equally important, it indicated that Indonesia and ASEAN Country's Parliament took a far distance from direct debate on the issue of Russia-Ukraine war and more inclined to focus on ASEAN internal issues.

Conclusion

It can be concurred that Indonesian *bebas-aktif* foreign policy has been articulated in various strategic behaviors. Although Indonesia pursued a multiple role in responding to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the basic principle is similar.

First, Indonesia portrays itself as an outright supporter of international laws particularly sovereignty and territorial integrity. Foreign policy behavior is characterized as a matter of upholding international laws instead of simply choosing in favor and against. It is evident that Indonesia viewed and responded to the UNGA resolutions on a case-by-case basis. Four important tenets were consistently

defended by foreign policy makers and Joko Widodo's narrative on the war in Ukraine: sovereignty, UN Charter, international law, and humanity. At the same time, Indonesia also voiced louder in opposing the Russian-backed referendum to annex four Ukrainian regions in the name of protecting territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Second, Indonesia has shown an integrationist foreign behavior instead of an isolationist role especially in facing confrontation between West and Russia. Indonesia withdrew in the voting for a resolution that called for expelling Russia from UN Security Permanent Membership and to disinvite Russia from the G20 Summit. Despite international pressure, Indonesia - both at the G20 Summit and P20 Summit - kept Russia in the G20 and invited Ukraine as guest of the house. Indonesia also firmly but elegantly refused to be "hijacked" by Western propaganda to maintain G20 as an economic forum instead of political alliance. Moreover, Indonesia actively pushed all parties into diplomacy and negotiation to end the war in Ukraine. This recurrent insistence is obviously stated in the UN General Assembly as well as parliamentary diplomatic activity such as at the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) forums where Indonesia serves as the member of the IPU Task Force on Russia-Ukraine peaceful resolution representing the Asia Pacific group. This action showed an integrationist role of foreign policy behavior.

Third, the *bebas-aktif* policy has been implemented by the Jokowi administration in maintaining close relations with Russia and Ukraine. Indonesia refrains from being too close to any party and being an ally to great power either the United States or Russia and China. Indonesia - both at government and parliament level - openly accepted bilateral meetings from both parties and heard Russia and Ukraine's perspective regarding

war, economic impact and conflict-induced humanitarian crises. In the context of Western and Russia contestation, it is also evident that Indonesia has consistently taken a balancing attitude and seeks to forge its identity as Asia's balancing force that is not always eye-to-eye with particular blocks.⁴⁸

Fourth, active foreign policy is conceptualized as an active engagement in international politics for the purpose of national interest. Jokowi's leadership intends to harness the opportunity to undertake bilateral relations and international engagement in the Russia-Ukraine war for the sake of hindering economic impacts. In the visit to Ukraine and Russia for instance, Joko Widodo called for both parties to guarantee the grain export to fuel national wheat demands and preclude the country from food price soaring. Indonesia's position on the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is self-serving to protect the national economy from inflation. Under Jokowi, diplomacy is considered as a political mechanism for economic growth and economic stability.

To conclude, Indonesia has pursued a multiple but intertwined foreign policy behavior regarding the Russia and Ukraine war. At a substantive level, Indonesia consistently sticks into fundamental international laws, particularly sovereignty and territorial integrity. At a more practical level, Indonesia conceptualizes its foreign policy role as an integrationist actor by stressing all parties to take into the negotiation table and refuse to use exclusion policy. Lastly, at more subtle practices, Indonesia has employed its foreign policy for the sake of domestic interests especially in terms of economic investment and public legitimacy support.

48 Ben Bland, "Indonesia shows the value of non-aligned leadership", *Chatham House*, 28 November 2022, accessed on August 11, 2023, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/11/indonesia-shows-value-non-aligned-leadership>.

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